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I. INTRODUCfiON 
Both Australia and the United States have constitutional protections against 
the establishment of religion and for freedom of both religion and speech. The 
First Amendment protects these freedoms in the United States.1 Sectio~ 116 of 
the Australian Constitution contains similar clauses on religion, but has no free 
speech clause.2 Nevertheless, the High Court of Australia found that freedom of 
communication on matters of government and politics was implicit in the 
constitutional provisions on voting for federal offices and constitutional 
referenda. 3 
The Australian High Court makes the purpose of a law of central impor-
tance in determining whether the law is an unconstitutional violation of the 
protections for religion and speech.4 The United States Supreme Court is less 
explicit, but recent decisions have also made purpose important to its First 
Amendment analysis.5 Sometimes purpose is expressly considered; at other 
times a concern with purpose motivates the Supreme Court's adoption of a 
doctrine. Purpose, in this sense, is neither the subjective motives of legislators 
voting for a measure nor the measure's likely objective effects. It is a construct 
of the law's goal derived from the likely effects of the measure, common human 
experience with respect to the likelihood that such effects would be desired by 
legislators or would be sought by such means in the context in which the law was 
adopted, supported with evidence for the law's context that may include 
statements of those involved in the process. 
Concern with purpose explains the judicial treatment of generally applica-
ble laws which regulate behavior that is not ordinarily engaged in for religious or 
expressive reasons. The restriction of religion or speech is not likely to be the 
purpose of the generally applicable law. Any restriction incidental to a law of 
general application will receive less scrutiny than limitations in laws focused on 
speech or religious activities.6 Some courts even say that generally applicable 
laws pose no constitutional issue at all. 
This Article describes Australian constitutional law with respect to religion 
and freedom of political discussion. A major theme of the handful of Australian 
High Court cases dealing with this issue has been the importance of determining 
the purpose or objective of the law. As part of this process, the Australian courts 
use the concept of proportionality. The High Court has deferred to the legisla-
ture, and it has begun to circumscribe the scope of constitutional protections for 
l. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 See AUSlL. CONST. ch. V, § 116. 
3. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (ACTV) (Austl. 1992) 177 
C.L.R. 106, 110-11 (Mason, C.J.). 
4. See id. at 240 (McHugh, J.). 
5. See generally Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996). 
6. See generally Michael C. Dorf,lncidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. 
L. REv. 1175, 1201 (1996) (analyzing the limiting principles developed by the Supreme Court in 
treating incidental burdens as infringements on fundamental constitutional rights to engage in 
primary conduct). 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 55 1997-1998
1997] Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech 55 
free speech. It may even borrow from conflicting United States precedents, and 
exempt generally applicable laws from constitutional scrutiny with a presumption 
that any impact on constitutionally protected religion or speech is incidental to 
legitimate purposes. This Article concludes by analyzing the arguments for 
treating generally applicable laws as immune from constitutional scrutiny, and 
suggests it is a bad idea. 
Australia and the United States each could profitably consider elements of 
the approach taken by the courts of the other nation to carefully scrutinize even 
generally applicable laws for their lack of proportion. The United States' experi-
ence with its religion clauses should make Australian courts wary of immunizing 
generally applicable laws from review under Section 116 of the Australian Con-
stitution. Similarly, the Australian insistence on proportionality to uncover 
improper purpose in political discussion cases provides a helpful note of caution 
for United States courts faced with free speech challenges to generally applicable 
laws. 
II. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL GuARANTEES FOR RELIGION AND SPEECH 
The Australian High Court traditionally approaches the relationship 
between the powers granted the central government and the limitations on those 
powers quite differently than the United States Supreme Court. The High 
Court's opinions focus on characterization-whether the law should be charac-
terized as one ''with respect to" a Commonwealth power. 7 The High Court is 
more skeptical than its United States counterpart of claims that an act is within 
the general powers of the central government. For example, the United States 
Supreme Court found the commerce clause'! permitted federal regulation of the 
amount of home grown wheat a farmer could consume because it substantially 
affected interstate commerce.9 In contrast, the Australian High Court held that 
the similar Australian trade and commerce clause1o did not authorize government 
operation of air service between two points in the same state even though such 
service was arguably necessary to make the concurrent service between the state 
and the Northern Territory economically viable. 11 · 
7. See Leslie Zines, Characterisation of Commonwealth Laws, in AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECfiVES 33 (H.P. Lee & George Winterton eds., 1992). 
8. 'The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
9. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The decision of Wickard was reaf-
firmed in a recent case that limited the reach of the commerce power. See United States v. Lopez, 
115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995). 
10. 'The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the 
peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: (i) Trade and commerce 
with other countries, and among the States." AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51(i). 
11. Attorney-General ex rel Ansett Transp. Indus. Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Nat'l Airlines 
Comm'n (Austl. 1976) 138 C.L.R. 492, 508 (Stephen, J.). 
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Until recently, the Australian High Court's careful scrutiny of whether an 
act is within a grant of power was matched by its reluctance to give substantial 
content to the affirmative restrictions on power.12 The High Court paid less 
attention to specific limitations on the granted powers in part because the 
founders of the Australian Constitution clearly repudiated the American-style 
Bill of Rights. 13 Nevertheless, the Australian Constitution does protect some 
individual rights. 14 The High Court revitalized several of these affirmative 
restrictions during the past several years and has even, within limits, implied new 
ones. 15 
12 Peter Hanks, Constitutional Guarantees, in AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPEcriVES, supra note 7, at 92-95. 
13. The High Court stated: 
[l]t is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a foundation for the implica-
tion of general guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. To make such 
an implication would run counter to the prevailing sentiment of the framers that 
there was no need to incorporate a comprehensive Bill of Rights in order to 
protect the rights and freedoms of citizens. That sentiment was one of the 
unexpressed assumptions on which the Constitution was drafted. 
Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 136 
(Mason, C.J.). One commentator stated, "The framers of the Australian Constitution were not pre-
pared to place fetters upon legislative action, except and in so far as it might be necessary for the 
purpose of distributing between the State and the central Government the full extent of legislative 
power." Sir Owen Dixon, Speech to the American Bar Association in August /944, in JESTING 
PILATE AND OTHER PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 101-02 (1965). Instead, "responsible government in a 
democracy is regarded by us as the ultimate guarantee of justice and individual rights." SIR 
ROBERT MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH 54 ( 1967). 
14. See N.K.F. O'Neill, Constitutional Human Rights in Australia, 17 FED. L. REv. 85, 85 
(1987). For example, section 41 provides rights .of electors of a state. /d. at 86. Section 51 xxxi 
permits the federal government to appropriate land but only on fair terms-the equivalent of the 
taking clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. /d. at 86-88. Section 80 
provides for trial by jury. /d. at 88. Section 92 speaks in broad terms of freedom of interstate trade, 
commerce and intercourse. /d. at 98. Section 117 is the equivalent of the privileges and 
immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution. /d. at 112-13. 
15. See, e.g., Cheatle v. Regina (Austl. 1993) 177 C.L.R. 541, 559 (Lathan, C.J.) (requiring 
a unanimous verdict in jury cases); Dietrich v. Regina (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 299 (Mason, 
C.J. and McHugh, J.) (requiring counsel for fair trial); Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. 
Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 134 (Mason, C.J.) (implying freedom of political discussion from 
the Constitution); Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n (Austl. 1989) 168 C.L.R. 461,493 (Mason, C.J.) 
(stating that Section 117 applies to forbid a residence requirement for membership in the bar, 
including the requirement that an attorney must practice primarily in Queensland, because it 
operated discriminatorily using reasonably proportionate type of analysis); see also GEOFFREY LIN-
DELL, Recent Developments in Constitutional Interpretation, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIAN 
CONSTmmONALLAW 1, 1 (1994) [hereinafter FUTURE DIRECfiONS]; Peter Bailey, "Righting" the 
Constitution Without a Bill of Rights, 23 FED. L. REV. 1 (1995) (surveying a series of twelve cases 
"curbing the power of the executive" and "focus[ing] on the protection of the rights of 
individuals"). 
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The religion clauses in the Australian Constitution prohibit laws "for 
establishing any religion . . . or for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion."16 This language has been a major factor in making the "purpose" of a 
challenged law determinative of its constitutionality. The centrality of purpose in 
the religion clauses has similarities to the High Court's approach to the new 
implied freedom of political discussion. In the freedom of political discussion 
cases, the High Court has tested the purpose of the law by its proportionality as a 
measure to implement a proper governmental interestP Nevertheless, the latest 
decisions display considerable deference toward the legislature in applying the 
constitutional standard and suggest some retreat from a broad view of the 
protected right. IS 
A. Section 116 of the Australian Constitution 
Section 116 of the Australian Constitution initially appears quite similar to 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 19 Section 116 
provides: "The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any 
religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification 
for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth."2:l 
There are major differences, however, in the subsequent development of 
the constitutional provisions of the two nations. The First Amendment has been 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 and its religious 
clauses have been the subject of much litigation.22 By contrast, section 116 
16. AUSTI... CONST.ch. V, § 116. 
17. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 143-44 
(Mason, C.J.). 
18. See, e.g., Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400, 405-06 (Brennan, 
C.J.) ("[l]f the impairment of the freedom is reasonably capable of being regarded as appropriate 
and adapted to the achieving of a legitimate legislative purpose and the impairment is merely 
incidental to the achievement of that purpose, the law is within power."). 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
20. AUSTI... CONST. ch. V, § 116. 
21. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution protects the free exercise of religion from deprivation by state 
governments acting without due process. /d. That protection incorporates the same standards as 
the First Amendment's protection of free exercise against federal government prohibitions. /d. 
22 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 
(1993) (examining free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment); Jesse H. Choper, 
The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944-45 (1985-86) (describing the strict scrutiny test of constitutionality 
as applied to religious liberty); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 58 1997-1998
58 Drake Law Review [Vol. 46 
applies only to the Commonwealth,23 and the High Court has never found a 
violation. 24 
One reason for the absence of section 116 litigation has been that the 
precedents are not promising for those who would attack commonwealth laws. 
The cases support a purpose-centered interpretation of section 116 which tends to 
uphold generally applicable laws that do not target religion. The High Court's 
latest decision reaffirmed the centrality of purpose to section 116, but left open, 
to some degree, the methodology to be used in determining purpose in such 
cases. 25 
The High Court has consistently held that section 116 is not violated unless 
the purpose-of the challenged law is to establish religion or prohibit its free exer-
cise.26 The High Court recently reaffirmed the centrality of purpose as the 
touchstone for constitutionality under section 116 in Kruger v. Commonwealth.Zl 
The decision, however, did not entirely resolve how the Court should determine 
purpose. 
The Kruger decision involved a suit brought by the so-called "stolen gen-
eration,"28 children who had been removed from their homes pursuant to the 
Aboriginals Ordinance of 1918, and one of the mothers whose children had been 
taken.19 Section 7 of the Ordinance made the Chief Protector of the Aboriginals 
the legal guardian of all aboriginal and half-caste children.30 Section 6 author-
ized him to take custody of the children if, in his opinion, it was necessary or 
desirable in the interests of the child to do so; section 16 allowed him to keep any 
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1990) (discussing that free exercise does not relieve an 
individual of complying with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability"). 
23. ENID CAMPBELL & HARRY WHITMORE, FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA 377 (1973). 
24. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. It should be noted that only one of the High 
Court's four decisions occurred within the past fifteen years. 
25. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 153-54 (Dawson, J .). 
26. See Attorney-General ex rei Black v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1981) 146 C.L.R. 559, 
604 (Gibbs, J.) (stating that a law that provides financial aid to a church-related school does not 
violate the establishment clause as long as its purpose is not to recognize it as a national institu-
tion); Adelaide Co. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 149 (Rich, J.) (stating that 
regulations preventing the dissemination of principles subversive to the Commonwealth do not 
infringe on section 116); Krygger v. Williams (Austl. 1912) 15 C.L.R. 366, 370 (Griffith, C.J.) 
(stating that compulsory military training is not a violation of the free exercise of religion); see also 
Stephen McLeish, Making Sense of Religion and the Constitution: A Fresh Start for Section I 16, 
18 MONASHU. L. REV. 207, 210(1992). 
27. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126. Justice McHugh did not 
reach this issue because he found that Section 116 did not apply to laws governing the territory. ld. 
at 218 (McHugh, J.). 
28. Thorpe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 144 A.L.R. 677,694 (Kirby, J.) (holding that 
suit for declaration dismissed for want of jurisdiction). 
29. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 132 (Brennan, C.J.). The Governor General 
promulgated the Ordinance in 1918 and amended it from time to time pursuant to powers conferred 
by section 7(3) of the Northern Territory Acceptance Act of 1910 and by section 13 of the Northern 
Territory (Administration) Act of 1910. /d. 
30. /d. at 133. 
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aboriginal or half-caste within the boundaries of a reservation or in an aboriginal 
institution.31 Regulations to carry out the Ordinance gave Protectors the discre-
tion to send any aboriginal or half-caste children to the nearest aboriginal 
institution or school. 32 Although Australians have regarded the practice of 
enforced separations as unacceptable for decades, the affected individuals had no 
recourse for the harm done.33 In 1997, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission engaged in an inquiry and made a report on the full extent and 
impact of these policies.34 The political climate surrounding the inquiry, the 
development of implied freedoms, and the expansive interpretation of other lim-
its on government by the High Court emboldened these plaintiffs to sue. 35 A 
critical part of their claim was that the Ordinance was unconstitutional36 and that 
such a constitutional violation gave rise to an individual cause of action. 37 Sec-
tion 122 of the Australian Constitution, however, gives Parliament plenary power 
to make laws for the territory.38 Thus, the plaintiffs' argument focused primarily 
on the claim that the Ordinance violated a limit on governmental power. 39 The 
only express limit they cited was Section 116.40 The plaintiffs claimed that 
removal from an aboriginal community separated the child from his or her 
culture and system of beliefs, thereby impairing the free exercise of religion. 41 
31. /d. at 133-34. 
32 /d. at 134 (citing Regulations (General) under section 3 of the Aboriginals Ordinance 
of 1918 and section 6 of the Aboriginal Regulations of 1933). 
33. /d. at 134-35. 
34. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, BRINGING THEM HOME: 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT 
ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES (1997). For an affecting story of the impact of this 
policy on an individual, see SALLY MORGAN, MY PLACE (1987). 
35. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 136 (Brennan, C.J.). 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 142. 
38. Section 122 states: 
The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered 
by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any Territory placed 
by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or 
otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of 
such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms 
which it thinks fit. 
AUSTL. CONST. ch. VI. § 122; see also Australian Nat'! Airways Ry. Ltd. v. Commonwealth 
(Austl. 1945) 71 C.L.R. 29 (discussing plenary character of the power). 
39. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 173-74 (Toohey, J.). 
40. /d. at 173. 
41. /d. at 173-74. The relationship of indigenous groups to the land has an important 
religious dimension. See Nonie Sharp, No Ordinary Case: Reflections Upon Mabo (No 2), 15 
SYD. L. REv. 143, 151 (1993). Nevertheless, the heated debates on the topic have not involved 
section 116. Clashes over aboriginal land rights have often been at the state level where section 
116 does not apply. The most significant development to date was the decision in Mabo v. Quee~ 
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The questions referred to the High Court included whether the power to enact 
laws, ordinances, and regulations for the territory was so restricted by any 
claimed limitations including section 116 as to invalidate them.42 
Five justices held that section 116 did not invalidate the Ordinance and 
regulations, 43 while the sixth insisted that the record was not sufficient to make 
the determination.44 Chief Justice Gerard Brennan stated that none of the laws as 
properly construed could be seen as a law for prohibiting the free exercise of 
religion because they did not appear to have a forbidden purpose.45 Even if 
individual "protectors" had taken children from their parents for the purpose of 
interfering with religious exercise, that would be an abuse of power rather than a 
ground for setting aside the regulations.46 Justice William Gummow stated that 
the question was "whether the Commonwealth has made a law in order to 
prohibit the free exercise of any religion, as the end to be achieved,"47 and Justice 
Daryl Dawson agreed with him on this point. 48 Justice Gummow concluded that 
even though the law might have the effect of denying the children instruction in 
the religious beliefs of their community: "there is nothing apparent in. the 1918 
Ordinance which suggests that it aptly is to be characterised as a law made in 
order to prohibit the free exercise of any such religion, as the objective to be 
achieved by the implementation of the law."49 Justice Toohey agreed that the 
language of the 1918 Ordinance did not disclose any forbidden purpose, and the 
High Court should state it did not violate section 116.~ Only Justice Mary 
Gaudron thought that the Ordinance might disclose a forbidden purpose on its 
stand (Austl. 1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. Prior to this case, it was generally accepted that the doctrine of 
terra nullius applied to Australia-that all law proceeded from the Crown. /d. at 26-27 (Brennan, 
J.). The High Court rejected this doctrine, finding that another legal system coexisted with crown 
sovereignty. /d. at 34. While Crown grants were recognized as extinguishing native title in crown 
courts, however unjust those actions might be, native title remained in lands that had not received a 
positive grant. /d. 
42 Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 173 (Toohey, J.). The proceedings followed 
section 18 of the Judiciary Act of 1903 which allows a member of the High Court sitting alone to 
reserve any question for consideration of the Full Court. Judiciary Act of 1903, § 18 (Austl.). The 
Chief Justice reserved the questions in this case on the basis that they do not call for any ascertain-
ment of facts which require submission of evidence. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 137 
(Brennan, C.J .). 
43. See Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 138 (Brennan, C.J.), 153 (Dawson, J.), 
173-74 (Toohey, J.), 218-20 (McHugh, J.), 232 (Gummow, J.). 
44. /d. at 212 (Gaudron, J.). 
45. /d. at 138 (Brennan, C.J.). 
46. /d. at 135-36. 
47. /d. at 232-33 (Gummow, J.). 
48. /d. at 153 (Dawson, J.). Justice Dawson also argued that section 116 was inapplicable 
to this case because it did not restrict the Commonwealth's power over the territories. /d. Justice 
McHugh agreed with him on this point. /d. at 218 (McHugh, J.). However, Justices Gummow, id. 
at 232 (Gummow, J.), Toohey, id. at 173 (Toohey, J.), and Gaudron, id. at 202-03 (Gaudron, J.) 
stated that section 116 did restrict section 122. 
49. /d. at 233 (Gummow, J.). 
50. /d. at 173-74 (Toohey, J.). 
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face.51 Given the effect of the law, Justice Gaudron argued that preventing 
participation of the children in religious practices that were part of the 
community activities might appear to be a purpose of the Ordinance. 52 
Justices Toohey and Gummow intimated that a law that was constitutional 
on its face might be challenged with evidence that it was a "circuitous device" to 
attain a forbidden end, but held that such a challenge was not appropriate in the 
posture of the case before them.53 They did not discuss what evidence they 
would accept or what standard would be applicable if the issue were properly 
presented. Justice Gummow did state, however, that "a law which protects or 
regulates the personal or property rights of others will not ordinarily offend 
[section] 116, despite curtailment by the general operation of that law of overt 
activity which in respect of some persons may give expression to their religious 
beliefs."54 Justice Gummow supported this statement by citing to Employment 
Division v. Smith,55 a United States case which stated that generally applicable 
laws are not subject to the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. 56 
While other justices considered the law to be religiously neutral on its face, 
Justice Gaudron derived purpose from its effect. 57 Because the effect on religion 
could have been the purpose of the law, Justice Gaudron argued that the Com-
monwealth could avoid section 116 only by pleading that the law was necessary 
to attain some overriding public purpose or that it was for a specific purpose 
unconnected with the free exercise of religion and only incidentally affected that 
freedom. 58 If the Commonwealth did so, "a question might arise, if the plea were 
to be made good, whether the interference with religious freedom, if any, 
effected by the Ordinance was appropriate and adapted or, which is the same 
thing, proportionate to the protection and preservation of those people. "59 
In sum, section 116 invalidates laws only when they are enacted with a 
forbidden purpose. But these cases do not resolve how a court determines 
whether a forbidden purpose exists. On the one hand, the High Court might find 
that a law which impairs free exercise without sufficient justification is 
"discriminatory," despite its apparent generality, and, therefore, has a forbidden 
"purpose." The same could be true of a law challenged as an "establishment." In 
cases decided under section 9200 and· section 117,61 the High Court found 
51. /d. at 208-09 (Gaudron, J.). 
52. /d. at 211. 
53. /d. at 173 (Toohey, J.), 233 (Gummow, J.). 
54. /d. at 232 (Gummow, J.). 
55. Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. 872 (1990). 
56. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 232 n.46l (Gummow, J.) (citing 
Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. at 878-80). 
57. /d. at 207 (Gaudron, J.). 
58. /d. at 211. 
59. /d. at 212. 
60. In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia, the High Court invalidated a fee 
imposed on nonrefillable bottles. Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia (Austl. 1990) 169 
C.L.R. 436, 477 (Mason, C.J., joined by Brennan, Deane, Dawson, and Toohey, JJ.). Noting that 
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discrimination existed because facially neutral laws had a differential impact. 
Applying section 116 in Kruger, Justice Gaudron inferred purpose from effect, 
even though the law was not triggered by religion.62 Justice Gaudron would use 
proportionality to test such a law.63 
On the other hand, prior decisions upheld generally applicable laws with 
comments that suggested that they did not pose a serious threat to section 116.64 
Most of the justices in Kruger looked to the religiously neutral appearance of the 
law in upholding it.65 Although the High Court might be willing to look behind 
the surface where a law impacts religion significantly with little justification and 
the surrounding discussion evinces a motive of establishment or suppression of 
religion, the search for purpose would begin with a strong presumption in the 
law's favor. In Kruger, Justice Gummow's reference to Smith supports the 
proposition that section 116 decisions may uphold generally applicable laws 
without carefully scrutinizing them. 66 
intrastate bottlers used refillable bottles, the High Court saw a substantial differential impact as a 
result of the state law. /d. at 475-76. In analyzing the basis for the law, the High Court noted that 
no significant differential fee between refillable and nonrefillable bottles was needed to encourage 
consumers to return bottles. /d. at 476. The only justification for a discriminatory fee was to 
discourage the use of nonrefillable bottles. /d. at 474. The energy and environmental costs of such 
bottles, however, were largely borne by other states where the bottles were made. /d. at 476. As a 
result, the High Court held that the fee was not reasonably proportionate to the legitimate bases for 
state action. /d. at 477. 
61. In Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n, the High Court invalidated a requirement that 
Queensland bar members not practice elsewhere, noting that the provision had a differential impact 
on nonresidents. Street v. Queensland Bar Ass'n (Austl. 1989) 168 C.L.R. 461, 589-90 (McHugh, 
J.). . 
62 Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 207 (Gaudron, J.). 
63. /d. 
64. For instance, Krygger v. Williams involved a law of general applicability, and the High 
Court saw no problem with its impact on religion. Krygger v. Williams (Austl. 1912) 15 C.L.R. 
366, 371-72 (Barton, J.). Closer scrutiny was given in Adelaide Co. v. Commonwealth because the 
law required examination of the religion's teachings. The Governor-General's decision was 
directed at a particular religious group, and its effect was devastating to the sect. Adelaide Co. v. 
Commonwealth (Austl. 1943) 67 C.L.R. 116, 134-35 (Latham, C.J.). Nevertheless, the High Court 
decided that section 116 was not violated. /d. at 131-32. The law supported the conduct of the 
war, and the religious motivation for opposition was irrelevant to the decision to suppress it. /d. at 
132-33. The justices in Attorney-General ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth did not examine the 
impact of the grant on religious schools, but nevertheless upheld them. Attorney General ex rel. 
Black v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1981) 146 C.L.R. 559. 
65. See Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 153 (Brennan, C.J.), 173 (Toohey, J.), 
233 (Gummow, J.). 
66. See id. at 233 (Gummow, J.) (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 484 U.S. 872, 878-80 
(1990)). 
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B. The Implied Freedom of Political Discussion 
The Australian Constitution does not have a First Amendment style clause 
that protects speech. The framers considered the American model, but omitted 
any reference to freedom of speech. 61 As a result, the High Court's implication 
of a constitutional protection for political discussion in the absence of an express 
guarantee generated a great deal of discussion.68 
Since 1992, an implied freedom of political discussion has become a per-
manent part of the Australian constitutional landscape. As with religious 
freedom, the High Court's standard for constitutionality focuses on the law's 
objective.69 Under the rubric of determining whether a law is "appropriate and 
adapted" to a valid objective, the High Court scrutinizes the proportionality of a 
challenged law as a means to implement legitimate government interests.'lll The 
High Court seems likely to apply that standard to generally applicable laws as 
well, while granting substantial deference to the legislature. 
67. Michael Stokes, Constitutional Commitments not Original Intentions: Interpretation 
in the Freedom of Speech Cases, 16 SYDNEY L. REV. 250, 254-55 (1994). 
68. See generally A.R. Blackshield, The Implied Freedom of Communication, in FuTuRE 
DIREcriONS, supra note 15, at 232-35; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Implications in Language, Law and 
the Constitution, in FuTuRE DIREcriONS supra note 15, at 150; Gabriel A. Moens, The Wrongs of a 
Constitutionally Entrenched Bill of Rights, in AUSTRALIA: REPUBLIC OR MONARCHY 233 (M.A. 
Stephenson & Clive Turner eds., 1994); Symposium: Constitutional Rights for Australia?, 16 
SYDNEY L. REv. 145 (1994); Gerard Carney, The Implied Freedom of Political Discussion-Its 
Impact on State Constitutions, 23 FED. L. REV. 180 (1995); Deborah Z. Cass,Through the Looking 
Glass: The High Court and the Right to Speech, 4 PuB. L. REV. 229 (1993); Peter Creighton, The 
Implied Guarantee of Free Political Communication, 23 U. WEST. Ausn.. L. REV. 163 (1993); 
Neil F. Douglas, Freedom of Expression Under the Australian Constitution, 16 U. NEW S. WALEs 
L.J. 315 (1993); J.J. Doyle, Constitutional Law: "At the Eye of the Storm," 23U. WEST. AUSTL. L. 
REV. 15 (1993); Arthur Glass, Australian Cap.ital Television and the Application of Constitutional 
Rights, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 29 (1995); Timothy H. Jones, Legal Protection for Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms: European Lessons for Australia, 22 FED. L. REV. 57 (1994); Geoffrey Kennett, 
Individual Rights, the High Court and the Constitution, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 581 (1994); Jeremy 
Kirk, Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy, 23 FED. L. REV. 37 (1995); 
Leighton McDonald, The Denizens of Democracy: The High Court and the "Free Speech" Cases, 
5 PuB. L. REV. 160 (1994); Robert M. O'Neil, Freedom of Expression and Public Affairs in 
Australia and the United States: Does a Written Bill of Rights Really Matter, 22 FED. L. REV. 1 
(1994); D.A. Smallbone, Recent Suggestions of an Implied "Bill of Rights" in the Constitution, 
Considered as Part of a General Trend in Constitutional Interpretation, 21 FED. L. REV. 254 
(1993); Donald Speagle, Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 18 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 938 (1992); Sally Walker,The Impact of the High Court's Free Speech Cases on Defamation 
Law, 17 SYDNEY L. REv. 43 (1995); George Williams, Civil Liberties and the Constitution-A 
Question of Interpretation, 5 PuB. L. REV. 82 (1994); George Williams, Engineers is Dead, Long 
Live the Engineers!, 17 SYDNEY L. REV. 62 (1995). 
69. Blackshield, supra note 68, at 251. 
70. /d. 
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1. The Implication of an Implied Freedom 
Australian Courts have long followed the English principle that "a court 
will interpret laws of the Parliament in light of a presumption that the Parliament 
does not intend to abrogate human rights and fundamental freedoms."71 High 
Court members have also considered fundamental freedoms in determining 
whether a law could be justified as incidental to a power granted to the com-
monwealth government. n Despite the influence that such background freedoms 
have had on the interpretation of the laws, and even on determining whether they 
were enacted as a means of carrying out a granted power, they do not prevent the 
legislature from validly enacting a law pursuant to an express grant of power 
even if the law's purpose was to impair a fundamental common-law value. 
In 1992, the High Court took the next step, deciding that freedom of politi-
cal discussion is implicit in the Constitution and directly limits legislative action 
even under express grants of power. In Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills ,13 the 
High Court unanimously invalidated a commonwealth law prohibiting criticism 
71. See In re Bolton (Austl. 1987) 162 C.L.R. 514, 523 (Brennan, J.); Potter v. Minahan 
(Austl. 1908) 7 C.L.R. 277, 304 (O'Connor, J.). Justice Brennan also stated, 'but the court cannot 
deny the validity of an exercise of a legislative power expressly granted merely on the ground that 
the law abrogates human rights and fundamental freedoms or trenches upon political rights which, 
in the court's opinion, should be preserved." Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 
C.L.R. 1, 43 (Brennan, J.); see also Bropho v. Western Australia. (Austl. 1990) 171 C.L.R. 1, 17-18 
(Mason, C.J., Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, and McHugh, JJ.); Wentworth v. NewS. Wales 
Bar Ass'n (Austl. 1992) 176 C.L.R. 239, 250-54 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.). 
72. Davis v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1988) 166 C.L.R. 79, 100 (Mason, C.J., Deane, and 
Gaudron, JJ.); Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1951) 83 C.L.R. l, 192-95 
(Dixon, J.); see also George Williams, Reading the Judicial Mind· Appellate Argument in the 
Communist Party Case, 15 SYDNEY L. REv. 3, 23-25 (1993). Where a statute can be justified only 
as a means to accomplish an end in power, an unnecessary impact on fundamental values may 
suggest the law was not designed to accomplish that end. 
In Nationwide News, Chief Justice Mason observed: 
Davis establishes two propositions. First, that, even if the purpose of a 
law is to achieve an end within power, it will not fall within the scope of what 
is incidental to the substantive power unless it is reasonably and appropriately 
adapted to the pursuit of an end within power, i.e., unless it is capable of being 
considered to be reasonably proportionate to the pursuit of that end. Secondly, 
in determining whether that requirement of reasonable proportionality is satis-
fied, it is material to ascertain whether, and to what extent, the law goes beyond 
what is reasonably necessary or conceivably desirable for the achievement of 
the legitimate object sought to be attained and, in so doing, causes adverse con-
sequences unrelated to the achievement of that object. In particular, it is 
material to ascertain whether those adverse consequences result in any 
infringement of fundamental values traditionally protected by the common law, 
such as freedom of expression. 
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills, 177 C.L.R. at 30-31 (Mason, C.J.) (footnotes omitted). 
73. Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. l. 
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of the Industrial Relations Commission. 74 Four Justices did so on the grounds of 
an implied freedom of speech.75 The other three Justices said that the statute was 
not reasonably appropriate as a means of exercising any specific power, and did 
not reach the issue of implied freedom.76 
On the same day, in Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Common-
wealth (A CTV),71 the High Court struck down a commonwealth ban on 
broadcasting political advertising during election periods in commonwealth, 
state, and territorial elections.78 The statute had prohibited the broadcast of any 
matter on behalf of the government or political advertisements by anyone during 
the election period, with exemptions for news programs and the like.79 It also 
required the allocation of free broadcast time to candidates during this period.IO 
Because the Constitution granted Parliament power to regulate broadcasting, 81 
the High Court had to decide whether the power was specifically limited.82 The 
Justices ruled that an implied freedom limited the granted power. 83 
Then Chief Justice Anthony Mason observed that "[f]reedom of communi-
cation [in relation to public affairs and political discussion] is so indispensable to 
the efficacy of the system of representative government for which the 
Constitution makes provision that it is necessarily implied in the making of that 
provision."84 He stated that the implied freedom extends to all matters of public 
affairs because there is no limit on matters that may be relevant to debate in the 
Commonwealth Parliament and because the fiscal relationship between 
Commonwealth and state governments creates the potential for matters of local 
74. /d. at 2. The High Court found that the statute which proscribed ''Words calculated to 
bring a member of the Commission or the Commission into disrepute" was not subject to the 
defenses normally available for persons charged with contempt of court. /d. at 26 (Mason, C.J.). 
But it is very unlikely that the legislators who adopted the statute and the commission that reviewed 
it recognized that this law would be interpreted to muzzle truthful criticism that demonstrated 
commission improprieties. 
75. /d. at 48-49 (Brennan, J.), 72-77 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.), and 94-95 (Gaudron, J.). 
76. /d. at 23 (Mason, C.J.), 84 (Danson, J.), 95 (McHugh, J.). 
77. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 
106. 
78. /d. at 147 (Mason, C.J.). 
79. /d. at 124. 
80. /d. 
81. Section 51(v) of the Australian Constitution grants power with respect to "postal, telt}-
graphic, telephonic, and other like services." AUSTL. CoNST. ch. V, § 5l(v). Radio and television 
broadcasting are "like services" under this section. See Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. v. Common-
wealth (Austl. 1966) 115 C.L.R. 418,432 (Kitto, J.); Jones v. Commonwealth (No.2) (Austl. 1965) 
112 C.L.R. 206, 226 (Kitto, J.). 
82. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 142-43 
(Mason, C.J.). 
83. /d. at 147. 
84. /d. at 140. 
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concern to become national.ss Therefore, the implied freedom applied to the 
entire statute, including the regulations dealing with state and territorial elections. 
Justices Deane, Toohey, and Gaudron agreed that the implied freedom applied to 
candidate discussion in all elections and that it was violated by the prohibition on 
political advertising combined with a system of free time that favored established 
political parties and discriminated against new ones.86 
Two years after ACTV, the High Court applied the new implied freedom in 
three cases, two of which involved state laws. By a four to three margin, the 
High Court stated that the implied freedom of political discussion in the 
Australian Constitution restricted common-law libel and state libel statutes as 
applied to criticism of federal legislators in Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly 
Times Ltd. fr1 and that a similar implication in a state constitution restricted their 
application to criticism of state legislators in Stephens v. West Australian 
Newspapers Ltd.88 In Cunliffe v. Commonwealth,'i1J the same four judges ruled 
that the implied freedom in the Australian Constitution applied to advising and 
representing aliens on immigration matters, although the High Court upheld the 
statute with the vote of one of the four who had declared the implied freedom 
applicable. ro 
Chief Justice Mason, joined by Justices Gaudron and Toohey in both 
Theophanous and Stephens, interpreted the implied freedom of political discus-
sion broadly, quoting Eric Barendt's definition of "political speech" to describe 
85. /d. at 142. 
86. Id. at 174 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.), 212 (Gaudron, J.). Justice McHugh agreed that the 
Act unconstitutionally interfered with freedom of choice in federal elections. /d. at 227 (McHugh, 
J.). He found that the Act's application to state elections was unconstitutional because it interfered 
with the functioning of the states. /d. at 244-45. Justice Brennan agreed that there was a 
constitutional implication of freedom of communication in federal elections, but he did not believe 
that the statute violated it. /d. at 149-62 (Brennan, J.). On the other hand, he agreed with Justice 
McHugh that a portion of the law impermissibly impaired the states. /d. at 162-64. Justice Dawson 
dissented since he thought the law was valid entirely. /d. at 189 (Dawson, J.). 
'ir1. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104. The joint 
opinion of Chief Justice Mason, Justi~e Toohey, and Justice Gaudron controlled. 
88. Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 211. Again 
the joint opinion of Chief Justice Mason and Justices Toohey and Gaudron controlled on the issue 
of the existence of the implied freedom and the standard to be applied because of the supporting 
vote of Justice Deane who would have given even greater protection to the speech. The three 
justices found, however, that the defense pleaded in one count was bad because the defendant failed 
to allege that publication was neither knowingly false nor reckless and was reasonable in the 
circumstances. /d. at 231-34 (Mason, C.J., Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.). 
89. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 272. 
90. /d. Although a majority-Chief Justice Mason, Justices Deane, Toohey, and 
Gaudron-found the implied freedom applicable, Justice Toohey found no violation. /d. at 378-85 
(Toohey, J.). Toohey's vote, together with the three justices-Brennan, Dawson, and McHugh-
who found the implied freedom of political discussion inapplicable, resulted in upholding the law. 
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what is protected: '"all speech relevant to the development of public opinion on 
the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about.'"91 
The plurality applied a balancing test which weighed the need to protect 
the efficacious working of representative democracy against protection of indi-
vidual reputation.92 They observed that the common law of libel tilted too far 
against freedom of communication,93 but the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan94 
standard used in the United States, which placed the burden on the plaintiff to 
prove knowing falsity or reckless disregard, tilted too far against reputational 
interests.95 Justice Deane voted with the plurality, although he would have 
completely abrogated state defamation laws with respect to publication of state-
ments about the official conduct or suitability of a member of the Parliament or 
other holder of high Commonwealth office.96 
While the majority's views on implied freedom were broad, the orders 
tended to be narrow. The question presented in Stephens was whether a defense 
to a defamation suit brought by a state legislator that was pleaded in terms of an 
implied freedom of communication was bad in law.97 The defendant failed to 
anticipate the Theophanous standard; the pleading assumed that plaintiff would 
have to demonstrate a violation of the New York Times standard.98 The High 
91. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 124 (quoting ERIC 
BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 152 (1985)). In separate opinions in Cunliffe, each of the members 
of the Theophanous majority found migration agents within this concept. Chief Justice Mason 
stated that freedom "necessarily extends to the workings of the courts and tribunals which 
administer and enforce the laws of this country." Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 298 
(Mason, C.J.). Justice Deane explained that immigration assistance and immigration 
representations "constitute communication and discussion about matters relating to the government 
of the Commonwealth, that is to say, political communication and discussion." /d. at 340-41 
(Deane, J.). Justice Gaudron concurred with Justice Deane on this point. /d. at 387 (Gaudron, J.). 
Justice Toohey held that freedom "must include the communication of information and the 
expression of opinions regarding matters that involve a minister of the Government." /d. at 380 
(Toohey, J.). 
92. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 131-33 (Mason, C.J., 
Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.). 
93. /d. at 131. 
94. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
95. The plurality would permit an affirmative defense in defamation actions brought by 
public officials if it is established that (1) the defendant was unaware of the falsity, (2) the defen-
dant did not publish recklessly-not caring if the statement was true or false, and (3) the 
publication was reasonable in the circumstances-steps were taken to determine the truth or there 
were sufficient reasons for failing to take such steps. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 140-41 (Mason, C.J., Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.). 
96. /d. at 188 (Deane, J.). . 
97. Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 211, 229-31 
(Mason, C.J., Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.). 
98. See id. at 234. 
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Court ruled that the pleading based on an implied freedom was erroneous.99 In 
Cunliffe, the High Court upheld a migration agent registration law against an 
implied freedom challenge. 100 Only in Theophanous did the High Court hold 
proper a pleading based on an implied freedom.IOI 
In two 1996 decisions, the High Court indicated that it would give signifi-
cant deference to the legislature in applying the implied freedom. In Langer v. 
Commonwealth, 102 the High Court upheld a Commonwealth law that prohibited 
persons from encouraging voters to mark their ballots in a manner not in accord 
with the ballot directions.103 The High Court reaffirmed the existence of some 
implied freedom, but ruled that it had not been violated. 104 The Justices con-
cluded that the law was "reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and 
adapted" to implement a proper policy relating to voting procedures. 105 Only 
Justice Dawson dissented, arguing that it violated the Constitutional provisions 
for elections by the people for government to punish people for telling electors 
the truth about a lawful means of voting. 105 
A similar state statute regulating elections for state legislators was unani-
mously upheld in Muldowney v. South Australia. 107 Not only did the Court hold 
that the law was appropriate and adapted, but members pointed out that the 
implication from the Commonwealth Constitution was to maintain the processes 
of the Commonwealth and not those of the states. l!ll 
99. /d. 
100. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 272, 333 (Brennan, J.), 367 
(Dawson, J.), 385 (Toohey, J.), 397 (McHugh, J.). 
101. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 140 (Mason, C.J., 
Toohey, and Gaudron, JJ.). 
102. Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400. 
103. /d. at 405 (Brennan, C.J.). 
104. /d. at 405-06. 
105. /d. at 419 (Toohey and Gaudron, JJ.); see David S. Bogen, Telling the Truth and 
Paying for It: A Comparison of Two Cases-Restrictions on Political Speech in Australia and 
Commercial Speech in the United States, 7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. Ill, 117-20 (1996) 
(discussing Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400). 
106. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. at 412 (Dawson, J., dissenting). 
107. Muldowney v. South Australia (Austl. 1996) 136 A.L.R. 18. 
108. Chief Justice Brennan said that the implied freedom of political discussion in the 
Commonwealth Constitution did not apply to state regulations of state elections. /d at 22-23 
(Brennan, C.J.). Justice Toohey stressed his view that the Commonwealth Constitution did not crt> 
ate any implication of representative government at the state level. /d. at 29 (Toohey, J.). Justice 
Gummow found the law would be constitutional even if the implied freedom were applicable, so he 
did not find it necessary to rule on whether the Commonwealth implied freedom applies to state 
regulations of state electoral processes. /d. at 40 (Gummow, J.). Justice McHugh agreed with 
Gummow's opinion, but he had previously stated that the implication from the federal constitution 
did not apply to state elections. /d. at 35 (McHugh, J.). Justice Gaudron's concurring opinion 
maintained the applicability of the implied freedom of political discussion in state elections. /d. at 
30 (Gaudron, J.). She acknowledged that '1t]he purpose of the freedom to discuss political matters 
identified in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills and in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth is to maintain the democratic processes of the Commonwealth of Australia, not 
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2. 1997: Lange, Kruger, and Levy 
Although the first decisions on the implied freedom of political communi-
cation seemed to suggest a general principle of representative democracy was 
implicit in the Constitution, the High Court has now rejected the implication of 
any principle that is not tied to the specific provisions of the Constitution.H~ 
Three decisions in 1997 examined the implied freedom, taking up a challenge to 
reexamine the concept that Justice Gummow had issued the previous year in a 
reapportionment case, McGinty v. State of Western Australia.l 10 
The reconsideration took place primarily in Lange v. Australian Broad-
casting Corp.l1 1 David Russell Lange, the former premier of New Zealand, sued 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation for defamation.112 The defendant 
pleaded both the constitutioml implied freedom and a common-law qualified 
those of its States." /d. Thus, her opinion was consistent with that of Justice Toohey. 
Nevertheless, she contended that the interrelationship of commonwealth and state governments 
made the implied freedom applicable to state as well as federal legislatures. /d. at 31-32. 
109. See Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96, 112. 
llO. McGinty v. Western Australia (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 289. Justice Gummow 
followed Justice McHugh in raising serious questions over whether any implication could be drawn 
from a principle of representative democracy apart from the specific provisions of the Constitution. 
/d. at 290-91 (McHugh, J.). In McGinty, the plaintiffs claimed that electoral districts must be equal 
in population because the Constitution required members of the House of Representatives of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to be "chosen by the people"-"one man, one vote" in United States 
terms. /d. at 293-94 (Brennan, C.J .); see also AUSTL. CONST. ch. I, § 24. The plaintiffs argued that 
ACTV supported their theory becllUSe it relied on a principle of representative democracy implicit in 
the electoral provisions. McGinty v. Western Australia, 134 A.L.R. at 364 (Gummow, J.). Justice 
Gummow, who replaced retired Chief Justice Mason, joined the Theophanous dissenters to uphold 
the existing electoral system. /d. at 390. They said that "chosen by the people" meant elections 
must be direct rather than indirect. /d. at 378. Although individual voters in a direct election must 
have an opportunity to discuss political issues in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement of 
choice, that does not control the size of the district in which they vote. /d. 
Justice Gummow accepted the implied freedom precedent of ACTV, but he suggested the 
need to reexamine the 1994 cases. /d. at 364. He saw them as suggesting a principle of 
representation beyond the specific provisions of the Constitution: 
[T]he process of constitutional interpretation by which this principle was 
derived (being an implication at a secondary level), and the nature of the impli-
cation (which restrains not only the exercise of legislative, executive or judicial 
power but also what otherwise would be the operation of the general law upon. 
private rights and obligations) departed from previously accepted methods of 
constitutional interpretation. If it now were sought to apply the princi pie then 
the need for further examination of it would arise. 
/d. at 391. 
Ill. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96. 
ll2 /d. at 99. 
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privilege, and the High Court took the occasion to reexamine its rulings in 
Theophanous and Stephens. 113 With Justice Michael Kirby replacing the retired 
Justice Deane, the High Court mustered a unanimous opinion. 114 
The opinion struck a compromise, rejecting several statements in Stephens 
and Theophanous, while reaffirming the basic implication of a constitutional 
freedom. 115 Although the High Court disavowed any principle of representative 
democracy apart from the Constitutional provisions, it left open how far the 
implications from those provisions might extend and it gave an even greater 
reach to the common-law privilege.116 The High Court struck down the constitu-
tional defense and concluded that the common-law qualified privilege was not 
supported by the particulars of the case.tt7 
The High Court stated that the implied constitutional freedom precluded 
the operation of English common-law defamation: 
Theophanous and Stephens should be accepted as deciding that in Australia 
the common law rules of defamation must conform to the requirements of 
the Constitution. Those cases should also be accepted as deciding that, at 
113. /d. at 96. 
114. /d. 
115. The High Court drew the support of the majority from the earlier cases by reaffirming 
the existence of an implied freedom incompatible with the common law as it previously existed. 
The Justices stated that the implied freedom extended beyond the election period, contrary to sug-
gestions in Justice McHugh's dissent in Theophanous, and that it applied to reports of the conduct 
of the executive branch, and could, in particular cases, reach discussion of matters at the state and 
local levels. /d. at 107. 
McHugh and Dawson had been particularly critical of extensions beyond specific constitu-
tional provisions. SeeTheophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 
198-205 (McHugh, J.); Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 
C.L.R. 106, 184 (Dawson, J.). They were reassured that the freedom of communication was tied to 
Constitutional provisions and not a principle that might extend beyond the areas dealt with by those 
provisions. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 145 A.L.R. at Ill. Chief Justice Brennan argued 
that the Constitution was 'not incompatible with the common law. Theophanous v. Herald & 
Weekly Times Ltd., 182 C.L.R. at 153 (Brennan, J.). An expansion of the common law qualified 
privilege, citing language from Justice McHugh in Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. 
resulted in finding that the common law was compatible. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 145 
A.L.R. at 115-16 (citing Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 
211, 264). The opinion in Lange reinstated protection for plaintiffs where the statement was 
actuated by malice. See id. at 118. Even if the defendant met its burden of showing that its 
conduct was otherwise reasonable, plaintiff could defeat the qualified privilege by demonstrating 
that the speech was "actuated" by malice. /d. The High Court agreed with Chief Justice Brennan's 
insistence that the implied freedom was not an individual right but a limitation on the granted 
power. /d. at 119. Finally, it required plaintiff to allege sufficient particulars to show the 
relationship to the specific Constitutional provision and did not permit any inference to be made 
that discussion of politics of another country would necessarily be within the freedom of 
communication. /d. 
116. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 145 A.L.R. at 104-06. 
117. /d. at 119. 
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least by 1992, the constitutional implication precluded an unqualified appli-
cation in Australia of the English common law of defamation in so far as it 
continued to provide no defense for the mistaken publication of defamatory 
matter concerning government and political matters to a wide audience. 118 
71 
In so doing, rather than supplanting the common law with the Constitution, 
the High Court changed the common law. Unlike in the United States where the 
"common law" is decided for each state by its own courts, the common law in 
Australia is determined by the High Court for all jurisdictions and thus is truly 
"common" throughout the land.l 19 Still, in developing the common law, the High 
Court noted that courts must act consistently with the Constitution.•~ "The com-
mon law of libel and slander could not be developed inconsistently with the 
Constitution, for the common law's protection of personal reputation must admit 
as an exception that qualified freedom to discuss government and politics which 
is required by the Constitution."l21 
In expanding the common-law qualified privilege in Lange, the Court 
could and did go beyond the requirements of the Constitution. It extended the 
privilege to protect communications made to the public on a government or 
political matter.l22 The High Court concluded that political and governmental 
matters should be considered of interest to everyone: 
With the increasing integration of the social, economic and political 
life of Australia, it is difficult to contend that the exercise or failure to exer-
cise public functions or powers at any particular level of government or 
administration, or in any part of the country, is not of relevant interest to the 
public of Australia generally .•n 
By reaching the discussion of government and political matters that affect 
the people of Australia, the privilege could apply to speech not within the free-
dom of communication implied from the specific constitutional provisions on 
federal elections, responsible government, and constitutional amendment: 
118. /d. at 103. 
119. /d. at 108-09. 
120. /d. at 111. 
121. /d. 
122 /d. at 115. The High Court held that the qualified privilege includes as a criterion 
"reasonableness of conduct" when the privilege is applied to publications that would not have been 
considered subject to the qualified privilege at English common law. /d. at 117. Further, the 
defense will be defeated if the plaintiff proves that the publication was "actuated" by ill will or 
other improper motive. /d. at 117-18. In this respect, the High Court reversed Theophanous. /d. at 
118. 
123. /d. at 115 (quoting Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 
C.L.R. 211, 264 (McHugh, J.)). 
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For example, discussion of matters concerning the United Nations or 
other countries may be protected by the extended defense of qualified 
privilege, even if those discussions cannot illuminate the choice for electors 
at federal elections or in amending the Constitution or cannot throw light on 
the administration of federal government. 
Similarly, discussion of government or poiitics at State or Territory 
level and even at local government level is amenable to protection by the 
extended category of qualified privilege, whether or not it bears on matters 
at the federallevel.J24 
In Lange, the defendant pleaded that the publication concerned the plaintiff 
as a member of the New Zealand Parliament and as Prime Minister of New Zea-
land.125 Because the pleadings revealed no connection with Australia, the High 
Court held that they did not bring the publication within the extended defense, 
leaving open the possibility that further particulars could bring the publication 
within the defense.126 "By reason of matters of geography, history, and constitu-
tional and trading arrangements, however, the discussion of matters concerning 
New Zealand may often affect or throw light on government or political matters 
in Australia."IZ7 
The High Court emphasized that its interpretation of an implied freedom of 
communication served to preserve the operation of the system of government, 
rather than to protect the individual: 
Unlike the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which 
has been interpreted to confer private rights, our Constitution contains no 
express right of freedom of communication or expression. Within our legal 
system, communications are free only to the extent that they are left 
unburdened by laws that comply with the Constitution. 128 
Thus, the High Court concluded that the defendants' claim that the matter was 
"published pursuant to a freedom guaranteed by the Commonwealth Constitution 
was bad in law." 129 The proper defense should be framed as a common-law or 
statutory privilege. Any claim that a statute improperly diminished that privilege 
in violation of the Constitution would not be stated as a defense to the defamation 
complaint, but as a response to specific assertion of that statute. 130 In other 
124. /d. at 115-16. 
125. /d. at 99. 
126. /d. at 96. 
127. /d. at 119. 
128. /d. at 112. 
129. /d. at 96. 
130. The High Court also held that the New South Wales defamation statute did not place 
an undue burden on protected communications, because section 22 protected matter published to 
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words, rather than claiming a right to speak, the defendant must claim that the 
legislature or the executive acted beyond its power. The focus should be on the 
extent of the powers of government rather than on individual rights. 
In construing the freedom of communication, the High Court left open a 
broad area for application. Freedom of communication protects not only free 
choice in federal elections, but also free choice in constitutional referenda. Fur-
thermore, because the executive branch is responsible to the legislature, the 
implied freedom extends to communication concerning the behavior of the 
executive and how the legislators react to it. "[T]he Constitution requires "the 
people" to be able to communicate with each other with respect to matters that 
could affect their choice in federal elections or constitutional referenda or that 
could throw light on the performance of ministers of State and the conduct of the 
executive branch of government." 131 Although the implied freedom arises from 
provisions on commonwealth government and referenda to amend the Constitu-
tion, it could extend as well to discussions of state policy when they impact 
electors' choices at the federal level: 
Of course, the discussion of matters at State, Territory or local level 
might bear on the choice that the people have to make in federal elections or 
in voting to amend the Constitution, and on their evaluation of the perform-
ance of federal ministers and their departments. The existence of national 
political parties operating at federal, State, Territory and local government 
levels, the financial dependence of State, Territory and local governments 
on federal funding and policies, and the increasing integration of social, 
economic and political matters in Australia make this conclusion 
inevitable. 132 
The other two cases from 1997, Kruger v. Commonwealth 133 and Levy v. 
Victoria, 134 suggested further limits on the extent to which the implied freedom 
could be expanded. Kruger raised the !ection 116 free exercise clause claim and 
dealt with implied freedoms. 135 The plaintiffs claimed that laws in the territory 
restraining the movement of aborigines and removing them from their homes 
were an impingement on the freedom of movement and of association necessary 
to have political communication. 136 But the Australian Constitution does not 
mandate elections in territories, and several justices indicated that the implied 
any person where the recipient had an interest or apparent interest in having information on a 
subject and the conduct of the publisher was reasonable in the circumstances. /d. at 114. 
131. /d. at 115. 
132. /d. at 116. 
133. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126. 
134. Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 248. 
135. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 128-29. 
136. /d. at 126. 
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freedom of political discussion did not apply in this case.137 Justice Gummow 
argued that even if some freedom and movement and association is necessary to 
make political communication effective, it did not stretch to the familial associa-
tion at issue in the case.'38 Justice Toohey acknowledged that the implied 
freedom included movement and association, but found no invalidity in these 
laws. 139 Justice Gaudron, however, contended that the discussion of Common-
wealth territorial policy was basic to representative and responsible government 
of the Commonwealth, and that excluding anyone from that discussion impairs 
it.l40 
In Levy, although the High Court made it clear that the implied freedom 
applied to expressive conduct as well as to verbal statements, the justices focused 
on the legitimacy of the law in question rather than on whether the implied free-
dom extended to the behavior regulated. 141 In that case, animal rights protesters 
challenged regulations that forbade persons without a license from entering 
hunting areas during the first two days of hunting season.142 The High Court 
assumed for the purposes of its decision that the implied freedom applied to these 
regulations, but ruled that they were valid laws in pursuit of safety .143 Even Jus-
tice Michael McHugh,. while suggesting the connection between the anti-hunting 
message and the constitutionally-protected freedom was not clear, rooted the 
decision on the conclusion that the law was reasonably appropriate and adapted 
to serving an end compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed government. 144 
Lange, Kruger, and Levy were particularly important in settling the con-
tours of the implied freedom because the court personnel is rapidly changing. 
Justice Dawson retired in August of 1997. Justice Toohey has announced his 
plans to retire in February of 1998. Chief Justice Brennan will also retire in 
1998. Of the seven Justices who decided ACTV, only Justices Gaudron and 
McHugh will remain. Nevertheless, the Court's unanimity in Lange 
demonstrates that the implied freedom has become an accepted tenet of 
Australian constitutional law. 
The scope of the implied freedom will probably vary with the composition 
of the court. For instance, some communications that Justice Gaudron would 
find necessary for free choice in elections would be beyond the reach that Justice 
McHugh would give the constitutionally implied freedom. Fortunately, there is a 
core of speech by and about candidates for office and the behavior of officials 
over which they have control that the entire High Court will find constitutionally 
protected. 
137. /d. at 163 (Dawson, J.), 219 (McHugh, J.). 
138. /d. at 229 (Gummow, J.). 
139. !d. at 178-79 (Toohey, J.). 
140. !d. at 195-200 (Gaudron, J.). 
141. Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 248, 252 (Brennan, C.J.). 
142 /d. at 250. 
143. /d. at 251-52. 
144. !d. at 277 (McHugh, J.). 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 75 1997-1998
1997] Religion Clauses and Freedom of Speech 75 
3. The Standards for Determining a Violation 
In Theophanous, the plurality explored the tension existing between com-
mon-law defamation and the requirements for a representative government and 
balanced the interests of individual reputation against those needs.t45 Both a bal-
ancing test and a concern for systemic needs appear to focus on the effect rather 
than the purpose of the challenged law. Nevertheless, the underlying concern of 
the High Court is with the purpose of the law. That is evident in the criteria for 
constitutionality unanimously articulated in lAnge: 
[T]he freedom will not invalidate a law enacted to satisfy some other 
legitimate end if the law satisfies two conditions. The first condition is that 
the object of the law is compatible with the maintenance of the constitution-
ally prescribed system of representative and responsible government or the 
procedure for submitting a proposed amendment to the Constitution to the 
informed decision of the people which the Constitution prescribes. The 
second is that the law is reasonably appropriate and adapted to achieving 
that legitimate object or end. t46 
If a law must be "enacted to satisfy some other legitimate end" to be valid, the 
High Court must determine whether the purpose of the law was legitimate. The 
conditions for upholding such a law are mechanisms for assuring the legitimacy 
of the purpose. The first condition demands that a legitimate purpose exists, and 
the second requires a relationship demonstrating that purpose is in fact the law's 
objective. 
a. The Legitimate Objective Test. The Lange court's first condition 
requires a law burdening the implied freedom to have a valid objective, one 
which is "compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed 
system."147 It is the law's objective, not its effect, that this condition addresses. 
Some objectives are plainly incompatible. Restrictions on speech enacted to per-
petuate the government or its policies by preventing electors from hearing 
negative viewpoints are inconsistent with the freedom of political discussion 
derived from the constitutional provisions for representative and responsible 
government. 
Prior decisions applying the Implied freedom have distinguished, in some 
way, between direct and incidental impairments.148 Such distinctions are based 
145. Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 125-33. 
146. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96, 108. 
147. !d. at 96-97. 
148. Former Chief Justice Mason distinguished between restrictions ''which target ideas or 
information [direct impairments within the meaning of this paper] and those which restrict an 
activity or mode of communication by which ideas or information are transmitted [which may be 
incidental impairments]." Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 
177 C.L.R. 106, 143 (Mason, C.J.). Justice McHugh distinguished between "Jaws which restrict 
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upon concern with the purpose of the law. A direct impairment indicates that 
suppression of political discussion was the law's objective while the incidental 
nature of an impairment indicates an objective unrelated to such suppression. 
Although the directness of the regulation of the content of political discussion 
suggests the purpose was the illegitimate one of suppressing political speech, the 
government may show that the law in fact had a proper objective. 
The purposes which a direct regulation of political discussion may validly 
serve have been variously described. Justices Toohey and Deane have stated that 
a law restricting political communications would be valid where 
the prohibitions and restrictions on political communications which it 
imposes are either conducive to the overall availability of the effective 
means of such communications or do not go beyond what is reasonably 
necessary for the preservation of an ordered and democratic society or for 
the protection or vindication of the legitimate claims of indiviquals to live 
peacefully and with dignity within such a society. 149 
the freedom of electoral communications by prohibiting or regulating their contents and laws which 
incidentally limit that freedom by regulating the time, place or manner of communication." !d. at 
234-35 (McHugh, J.). 
Justices Deane and Toohey used characterization to distinguish between laws that 
affect political communications for reasons related to their nature as political communications 
(direct) and those whose effect is unrelated (incidental): 
[A) law whose character is that of a law with respect to the prohibition or 
control of some or all communications relating to government or governmental 
instrumentalities will be much more difficult to justify as consistent with the 
implication than will a law whose character is that of a law with respect to some 
other subject and whose effect on such communications is unrelated to their 
nature as communications of the relevant kind. 
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. I, 76-77 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.). 
Chief Justice Brennan insisted that a law that infringes the limitation on power will not be sup-
ported by the "power unless the infringement is merely incidental to the achievement of a 
legitimate (that is, non-infringing) purpose or object." Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 
182 C.L.R. 272, 324 (Brennan, J.). Justice Gaudron insisted that curtailing political discussion was 
an impermissible purpose for a law, but said that a law enacted to secure an end within power may 
be permissible despite its "incidental" impact on the protected freedom. Nationwide News Pty. 
Ltd. v. Wills, 177 C.L.R. at 95 (Gaudron, J.). Finally, Justice Gummow stressed the legitimacy of 
the statute's primary objective in upholding a statute challenged as a violation of the implied free-
dom. Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400,432 (Gummow, J.) ('The primary 
objective of the system established by the legislation involves observance by electors of [section] 
240."). 
149. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 169 (Deane 
and Toohey, JJ.) (footnote omitted). 
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Justice Deane later wrote that '"necessary' in this context implies the existence of 
a pressing social need, and that interference with freedom of expression should 
be no more than is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued."1SO 
In general, the likelihood that a direct regulation of speech has an objective 
that is incompatible with the maintenance of the system has led justices to 
demand strong justifications for such laws. Chief Justice Mason and Justice 
McHugh would require a "compelling justification" to uphold direct regula-
tions.151 Justice Gaudron referred to "an overriding and important public 
interest" as necessary to show that a law imposing a direct prohibition on politi-
cal discussion had a valid purpose.152 Where only a minor public interest is 
offered for a direct prohibition on political discussion, the asserted justification is 
likely to be a pretext for an impermissible objective.153 
In Kruger, Justice Gaudron stated that the only test for a law is whether the 
purpose of the law is to prohibit or restrict political communication.154 
"Questions directed to compelling justification, necessity and proportionality are, 
at base, questions directed to ascertaining the purpose of the law in question." 155 
She then set out the relationship between the search for purpose and the 
distinction between direct and indirect burdens on political communication: 
[T]he purpose of a law is to be ascertained by its nature, its operation and 
the facts with which it deals. In ascertaining that purpose, a law which is, in 
terms, a prohibition or restriction on political communication or which 
operates directly to prevent or curtail discussion of political matters is, in 
my view, to be taken to have that purpose unless the prohibition or restric-
tion is necessary for the attainment of some overriding public purpose (for 
example, to prevent criminal conspiracies) or, in the terms used by Deane J 
in Cunliffe v The Commonwealth, to satisfy some "pressing social need" 
(for example, to prevent sedition). 156 
b. Proportionality and the "Appropriate and Adapted" Test. Even if the 
government identifies a legitimate objective furthered by the challenged law, the 
High Court will examine the relationship between the means and the purported 
legitimate end of the law. The High Court in Lange referred to the problem of 
describing how that examination should take place: 
150. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 340 (Deane, J.) (quoting Attorney General 
v. Guardian Newspapers (No.2) (Austl. 1990) 1 A. C. 109, 283-84) (internal quotes omitted). 
151. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 143 (Mason, 
C.J.), 235 (McHugh, J.). 
152 Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 388 (Gaudron, J.). 
153. /d. 
154. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 206 (Gaudron, J.). 
155. /d. 
156. /d. 
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Different formulae have been used by members of this court in other cases 
to express the test whether the freedom provided by the Constitution has 
been infringed. Some judges have expressed the test as whether the law is 
reasonably appropriate and adapted to the fulfillment of a legitimate 
purpose. Others have favoured different expressions, including 
proportionality. 157 
Most Justices have insisted that the means be proportionate to the end of 
furthering a competing public interest, even if the law does not discriminate 
among speakers or ideas. 158 Proportionality is relevant to determining the true 
purpose of the statute. 1S9 
Chief Justice Brennan would use proportionality to test the validity of a 
law that restricts communication while serving a legitimate interest.160 "[T]he 
restriction must serve some other legitimate interest and it must be proportionate 
to the interest to be served." 161 Brennan subsequently explained that proportion-
ality "is intended to embrace both the law's achieving of a legitimate purpose and 
the incidental character of its restriction on an absolute freedom to discuss gov-
ernment, governmental institutions and political matters."162 In Cunliffe, Justice 
Brennan equated "proportionate" with "reasonably appropriate and adapted" to a 
legitimate end. 163 
157. Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (Austl. 1997) 145 A.L.R. 96, 108. 
158. Justice McHugh would examine content neutral laws affecting the implied freedom to 
determine whether the restraint "is not disproportionate to the end sought to be achieved:' Austra-
lian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, 235 (McHugh, 
J.). Justice Toohey said, "the requirement of reasonable proportionality assists in the reconciliation 
of what may be proffered as irreconcilable principles. The implied freedom does not override the 
express grant of power. Rather, it points to the likely limits of the express grant." Cunliffe v. 
Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 376 (Toohey, J .). Justice Kirby would also use proportionality to 
test laws challenged as impairing the freedom of political communication. Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 
1997) 146 A.L.R. 248, 292 ("It is a useful concept, including in the context of burdens upon con-
stitutional freedoms, so long as it is realized that it describes a process of reasoning and does not 
provide a sure answer to its outcome."). 
159. Former Chief Justice Mason wrote that the public interest in free communication must 
be balanced against the competing public interest and that the restriction must be reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the competing public interest. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. 
Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 143-44 (Mason, C.J.) ("If the restriction imposes a burden on free 
communication that is disproportionate to the attainment of the competing public interest, then the 
existence of the disproportionate burden indicates that the purpose and effect of the restriction is in 
fact to impair freedom of communication."). 
160. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 150 
(Brennan, J.). 
161. /d. 
162 Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 152 
(Brennan, J.). 
163. Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 324 (Brennan, J.). Reiterating his views in 
Langer, Chief Justice Brennan stated, "In my view, if the impairment of the freedom is reasonably 
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Justice Gaudron used proportionality to determine purpose in two different 
ways. Where the law directly interferes with political communications, the inter-
ference requires a compelling justification and the law must be necessary to 
achieve that end. 164 ''Whether a law is necessary for some such purpose depends 
on whether it is 'no more than is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.' 
That in tum depends on whether less drastic measures are available.'' 165 The less 
drastic alternative comparison is not necessary to determine the proportionality of 
a measure when the impact on speech is clearly incidental. 166 In that context, 
Justice Gaudron simply equated proportionality with "appropriate and 
adapted." 167 
There are few Australian cases concerning proportionality as an element of 
limitations on power. 168 The initial implied freedom cases examined laws that 
applied only to expressive activities such as criticism of government officials, 
political advertising, defamation of federal or state officials, advice to or repre-
sentation of immigrants, encouraging improper voting procedures in federal or 
state elections, and defamation of foreign officials. Specific applications of 
proportionality in those cases sparked disagreement among the Justices, some-
times because they had a different appreciation of the facts and sometimes 
because they afforded the Parliament different degrees of deference. 169 
capable of being regarded as appropriate and adapted to the achieving of a legitimate legislative 
purpose and the impairment is merely incidental to the achievement of that purpose, the law is 
within power." Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400,405-06 (Brennan, C.J.). 
/d. 
164. Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 207 (Gaudron, J.). 
165. /d. (quoting Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 340 (Deane, J.)). 
166. /d. 
167. /d. at 207 (Gaudron, J.). Justice Gaudron stated: 
[A] Jaw with respect to some subject-matter unconnected with the discussion of 
political matters and which only incidentally impinges on the freedom of that 
discussion, is not to be taken to be a Jaw for the purpose of restricting that 
freedom if it is reasonably appropriate and a~apted or, which is the same thing, 
proportionate to some legitimate purpose connected with that other subject 
matter. 
168. See generally Brian F. Fitzgerald, Proportionality and Australian Constitutionalism, 
12 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 263 (1993); H.P. Lee, Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adju-
dication, in FUTUREDIREcriONS, supra note 15, at 126-49; A.R. Blackshield, The Implied Freedom 
of Communication, in FuTuRE DIRECTIONS, supra note 15, at 232-68; Brian F. Fitzgerald, 
Characterization, Proportionality and Constitutional (Legislative) Validity (unpublished manuscript 
on file with author). 
169. For example, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority and found portions of the 
statutes at issue proportionate to the legitimate ends in ACTV. Australian Capital Television Pty. 
Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. I 06, 164-67 (Brennan, J ., dissenting); see also 
Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 154-55 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Stephens v. West Australian Newspapers Ltd. (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 211,236, 2S 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Toohey disagreed with Justices Mason, Deane, and Gaudron 
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The Kruger and Levy cases involved laws of general application which the 
members of the High Court found appropriate and adapted to the fulfillment of a 
proper constitutional purpose, 170 but that test may apply for the constitutionality 
of any law. While Justice Gaudron specifically stated that she would use propor-
tionality to test generally applicable laws affecting the freedom of political 
communication, 171 it is not clear how rigorously the Justices would scrutinize 
such laws. 
c. Deference. Former Chief Justice Mason insisted that the court must 
determine whether the burden or restriction on political discussion is reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to the relevant purpose. 172 Chief Justice Mason distin-
guished the High Court's role in determinations of power from its role in 
assessing limitations on power like the implied freedom of political discussion. 173 
In determining whether a law is within power, ''the question is whether the law is 
capable of being reasonably considered to be appropriate and adapted to the end 
sought to be achieved."174 In other words, even if the High Court believes the 
law is not reasonably appropriate and adapted to an end, the High Court must 
uphold it if others, like the Commonwealth Parliament, could reasonably believe 
the law to be appropriate and adapted to that end. When reasonable minds differ, 
the law should be sustained: In contrast, where the issue is whether a limit on 
power has been violated, the Court must decide for itself whether the burden is 
reasonably appropriate and adapted.t75 
Other justices, however, may be more deferential than former Chief Justice 
Mason. Chief Justice Brennan used the same deferential standard for examining 
whether a law violated a limitation on power that he used for finding a law within 
power-"whether the operation of the law 'is capable of being reasonably 
considered to be appropriate and adapted to achieve'" the appropriate purpose. 176 
Justice Gaudron initially agreed with Justice Mason that the High Court 
should decide for itself if constitutional limits had been exceeded,177 and Justice 
Toohey joined Justice Deane in saying that a law whose character is that of a law 
with respect to the prohibition or control of some or all communications relating 
to government demands a reasonably necessary standard. 178 These Justices did 
not defer in assessing the constitutional issues in ACTV, Theophanous, and 
when he found the law regulating registration of immigration agents proportionate in Cunliffe. See 
Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 272, 380-84 (Toohey, J., dissenting). 
170. See Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 245-46; Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 
146 A.L.R. 248, 252 (Brennan, C.J.). 
171. Kruger v. Commonwealth, 146 A.L.R. at 207 (Gaudron, J.); Levy v. Victoria, 146 
A.L.R. at 270-71 (Gaudron, J.). 
172 Cunliffe v. Commonwealth, 182 C.L.R. at 300. 
173. /d. 
174. /d. (emphasis added). 
175. /d. 
176. /d. at 324 (Brennan, J.) (adopting the standard stated by Justice Deane in Richardson v. 
Forestry Comm'n (Austl. 1988) 164 C.L.R. 261, 311 (Deane, J., dissenting)). 
177. /d. at 387-88. 
178. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 
106, 169 (Deane and Toohey, JJ.). 
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Stephens. Nevertheless, Justices Toohey and Gaudron took a deferential view of 
the law in Langer when the government claimed that the challenged statute actu-
ally enhanced the democratic process. Prior decisions established that deference 
was appropriate for determining whether a law was within the power of Parlia-
ment to make election laws, but Justices Toohey and Gaudron gave the same 
deference to Parliament when discussing whether the law violated the implied 
freedom of political discussion. They supported the statute on the ground that it 
was "reasonably capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted to further-
ing or enhancing the democratic process."179 Whether these Justices have 
changed their position and intend to follow Chief Justice Brennan~~ in using 
such a deferential standard in all cases, or whether their deference is limited to 
laws purporting to enhance the political process, remains an open question. On 
the one hand, Justice Gaudron indicated in Levy that the standard, "reasonably 
capable of being regarded as appropriate," was a standard for determining 
whether a law was an exercise of a constitutionally granted power; it was less 
stringent than the one she preferred in the context of constitutional freedoms, and 
she suggested that it would be inappropriate for laws directly regulating religion 
or political communication.181 In that light, her opinion in Langer was based on 
the assumption that the laws promoted rather than impaired the democratic proc-
ess.182 Therefore, the appropriate standard was one to determine whether it might 
be said to further the democratic process, an issue of characterization, because 
the implied freedom would by definition not be invoked. On the other hand, the 
political advertising restrictions Justice Gaudron struck down in ACTV were 
alleged to enhance the democratic process.183 
4. Summary 
In relation to the free exercise of religion, behavior dictated by religious 
belief, freedom of speech, the communication of ideas, the suppression of relig-
iously motivated behavior or of ideas is an improper ground for regulation. The 
issue under the Australian Constitution's clauses on free exercise and establish-
179. Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1996) 134 A.L.R. 400, 418 (Toohey and Gaudron, 
JJ.). Justice Gummow did not commit himself on the standard, but he did say in upholding the 
statute that the implied freedom "does not facilitate or protect that which is intended to weaken or 
deplete an essential component of the system of representative government." /d. at 431 (Gummow, 
J.). 
180. Justice Brennan also voted in favor of the law because the impairment was "reasonably 
capable of being viewed as appropriate and adapted to the achieving of a legitimate legislative pur-
pose and the impairment is merely incidental to the achievement of that purpose." /d. at 405-06 
(Brennan, C.J.). 
181. Levy v. Victoria (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 248,270 (Gaudron, J.). 
182. Langer v. Commonwealth, 134 A.L.R. at 418-19 (Gaudron, J.). 
183. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 177 C.L.R. at 118 (oral 
argument of G. Griffith Q.C., Solicitor-General for the Commonwealth). 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 82 1997-1998
82 Drake Law Review [Vol. 46 
ment of religion is whether a law has a forbidden objective. 184 The law's purpose 
is also central to the constitutional implication of freedom of political discussion. 
Speech regulation must not be based on disagreement with an idea or fear that the 
idea would lead to bad results if widely accepted and democratically adopted. 
But, the incidental impact on religious exercise or speech from action taken for 
legitimate reasons would not abridge either the free exercise of religion or free-
dom of speech if those freedoms mean only that certain grounds for 
governmental action are not legitimate. · The High Court examines challenged 
laws to determine if the means which impact on speech are proportionate to the 
legitimate end the law is supposed to serve. In the future, the High Court will 
probably apply a "reasonably proportionate" test to any law of general applica-
tion185 impairing the free exercise of religion as well. It is consistent with a 
"purpose" analysis of the right involved, but it could be more accurate and effec-
tive in protecting that right than a direct inquiry into purpose. Indeed, the 
standard of reasonable proportionality may be close to the United States test, 
which requires an important or substantial interest unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression and no more impairment of First Amendment freedoms than is 
essential to further that interest.186 Both standards offer an approach to a pur-
pose-oriented analysis that gives religion and speech real protection while 
allowing government to fulfill its legitimate functions. At the same time, both 
raise concerns that a deferential application of the standard could allow 
inappropriate laws to survive. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The United States Supreme Court is beginning to focus on the purpose of 
the law in applying the First Amendment to the Constitution. This has led the 
Supreme Court to exempt generally applicable laws from First Amendment scru-
tiny. Congress reacted to the impact of these decisions in the free exercise area 
with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,187 which the Supreme Court in tum 
invalidated. 188 The jurisprudence remains unsettled in establishment clause and 
free speech areas. 
A. Free Exercise of Religion 
The word "for" in Section 116 of the Australian Constitution, which for-
bids the Commonwealth making any law "for establishing any religion ... or for 
184. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 146 A.L.R. 126, 138 (Brennan, C.J.). 
185. A generally applicable law is a provision of law, whether statutory or common law, 
regulating behavior that is usually engaged in for reasons other than the expression of ideas or the 
exercise of religion. Thus, drug and alcohol restrictions, limits on polygamy, and prohibitions 
against cruelty to animals are generally applicable laws. A regulation of kneeling before a railing 
and consuming wine and wafers served by another would not be a generally applicable law because 
that behavior is usually engaged in for religious purposes. 
186. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
187. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb (1994). 
188. See City of Boerne v. Aores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,2172 (1997). 
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prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, " 189 supports the High Court's focus 
on whether the purpose of government action was to prohibit free exercise. The 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution seems to forbid laws that have 
that effect, regardless of their purpose.1!ll Nevertheless, decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court offer little more protection for religious exercise than those 
of the Australian High Court. 
1. The Cases 
Early United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the free exercise 
clause of the First Amendment insisted that religious belief did not excuse viola-
tions of the general criminal law .191 Later decisions afforded religious belief 
protection from general laws. In 1963, the Supreme Court invalidated the denial 
of unemployment benefits to a person who was unavailable to work on Saturday 
because of her religious beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner, 192 the Supreme Court said 
that the state needed to show a "compelling interest" to justify the application of 
the unemployment law to this situation. 193 The high point of the Court's solici-
tude for religious expression was Wisconsin v. Yoder, 194 where it held that 
Wisconsin could not require Amish children to attend school beyond the eighth 
grade.195 The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court outside the unemploy-
ment benefits context rejected free exercise claims on the grounds that the burden 
on religion was insufficient to trigger the test or that the test was met.196 
Free exercise clause interpretation has now largely returned to its earliest 
form as a result of the 1990 decision Employment Division v. Smith. 197 In that 
case, Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs with a drug 
rehabilitation organization in Oregon because they had consumed peyote. 198 
Smith and Black sued to obtain unemployment compensation, claiming that 
189. Ausn... CONST. ch. V, § 116 (emphasis added). 
190. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion ... or abridging the freedom of speech .... ") (emphasis added). 
191. See,e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) ("Can a man excuse 
his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land .... "). 
192 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
193. /d. at 406. 
194. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
195. /d. at 234. 
196. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 
(1988) (stating that the United States government may permit timber harvesting and road 
construction through a portion of national forest traditionally used for religious purposes); Goldman 
v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506-10 (1986) (holding that uniform military law may be applied to 
prohibit wearing of yarmulke in doors); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982) (ruling 
that an Amish employer is required to participate in the social security system). 
197. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
198. /d. at 874. 
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denial prohibited the free exercise of their religion, because peyote use was an 
essential sacrament of the Native American Church.199 Given American 
concerns over drug use, it is not surprising that they lost. Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor's concurring opinion stated that the state had a sufficiently compelling 
interest in drug law enforcement to prohibit drug use, even for religious 
purposes.n> Justice O'Connor did not join the majority opinion, however, 
because they took a much more controversial route to the same result.~1 Justice 
Antonin Scalia's majority opinion suggested that neutral laws of general 
applicability were immune from a First Amendment challenge.:m He compared 
the drug law to a general tax and stated, "[l]f prohibiting the exercise of religion 
(or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the 
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First 
Amendment has not been offended. "W -
Despite Justice O'Connor's belief that neutral laws of general applicability 
have no "talismanic" immunity from scrutiny under the First Amendment,204 the 
Court has continued to assert that "[i]n addressing the constitutional protection 
for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law 
that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a 
particular religious practice. "205 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court, like the Australian High Court, 
focuses its inquiry on the objective of a law that affects the free exercise of 
religion. If the impact on free exercise is only incidental, the law will be upheld. 
But generally applicable drug laws may bar sacramental peyote use as effectively 
as a law that forbids only the religious use. The failure to consider the impact of 
the law, the importance of the government's interest and whether the law needs 
to apply to religious conduct to secure that interest, threatens to allow harm to 
religious expression without furthering the legitimate interests of the government. 
199. /d. 
200. /d. at 906. 
201. !d. at 891. 
202. /d. at 879. The content neutral law is, for these purposes, a law whose application does 
not tum on the religious or communicative aspect of the behavior. A law that forbids interference 
with the military may be of general application because most interference will result from actions 
that are not primarily the expression of the ideas such as destruction of an ammunition dump or of 
files and records. But, if the determination of the existence of a law violation requires the court to 
examine the content of the words-a speech against military operations to determine whether they 
violate the policy of the law-the law is not content neutral. 
203. /d. at 878. In Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Justice Scalia explained his Smith opinion. 
Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). He characterized 
Smith as holding "that general laws not specifically targeted at religious practices did not require 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny even though they diminished some people's ability to 
practice their religion." /d. 
204. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
205. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,531 (1993). 
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2. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Problems with immunizing generally applicable laws from First Amend-
ment free exercise scrutiny spawned a political solution in the United States. 
Mainstream religions perceived Smith to be an attack on religious freedom and 
combined with new and splinter groups to lobby for legislative protection of their 
interests.ns They believed that Smith devalued religious acts and threatened their 
own practices.207 Prior decisions, which had protected pacifists that refused to 
make weapons and Sabbatarians that refused to work on Saturday, now appeared 
vulnerable.n Congress responded to these concerns with The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act,YJ which attempted to restore the prior law by requiring a 
compelling interest to justify any substantial burden on religion imposed by the 
state.210 
Recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores,211 the Supreme Court invalidated the 
Act. 212 The majority held that Congress lacks power to affect the substance of a 
constitutional right, and that Congress went beyond what was appropriate as a 
remedy. 213 The three dissenters, Justices Sandra Day GConnor, Stephen Breyer, 
and David Souter objected to the majority's failure to reconsider the correctness 
of Smith, and would have set the case for reargument.214 Despite the decision in 
Boerne, the political response may some day inspire the Supreme Court to revise 
its judicial views on religion, recognizing that immunity from scrutiny is not a 
healthy response to any law affecting basic human rights. 215 
B. Establishment of Religion 
Unlike Australia, the United States Supreme Court refused to limit its 
establishment clause analysis to the purpose of the action. In Everson v. Board of 
Education,2•6 the Supreme Court initially wrote of the "wall between church and 
206. Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 62 
FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1994). 
7JJ7. /d. at 897. 
208. See generally Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (stating that an individual 
was entitled to unemployment benefits when he quit for religious reasons after learning that the 
steel which he was engaged in producing was used for producing armaments); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that Sabbatarian was entitled to unemployment benefits when fired 
for refusing to work on Saturday). 
'21.1J. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
210. /d. § 2000bb(b)(l). 
211. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). 
212 /d. at 2172. 
213. /d. 
214. /d. at 2186 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
215. See David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendmen~ 26 Sw. U. L. 
REV. 201,204 {1997). 
216. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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state."217 In School District v. Schempp,218 the Supreme Court said "to withstand 
the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative 
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. "219 The 
Supreme Court has also expressed concerns with laws whose administration 
entangled the government with religion. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,m the Court 
announced a three-part test that required challenged legislation to: 1) have a 
secular legislative purpose; 2) have a principal or primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; and 3) not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.22t 
While "purpose" rears its head in Lemon, it is only a portion of that test. 
The primary effect of the law is a separate part of the test, and the law's effect, 
rather than purpose, is more likely to cause it to run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause. When construing a statute, a court often looks to the purpose of a law to 
determine what effect they should give it.222 When determining whether the 
law's purpose is legitimate, the analysis is reversed; the Court uses the law's 
effect to determine its purpose. 
The "purpose" of legislation is not the conflicting desires of those who 
voted for it, but instead the end which it serves. Under normal circumstances, the 
statute's objective is to achieve an effect. Laws, however, have multiple effects. 
"Purpose" analysis distinguishes among those effects to select some as objectives 
and others as incidental consequences. It is essentially a fictional notion derived 
from the possible aims of legislation, as determined by its likely effects and 
actual effects, and refined by consideration of the normal significance of those 
effects and alternative means to produce them.223 Although the existence of a 
secular effect opens up the possibility of a secular purpose for a law, the primary 
or principal effect of a law is the best evidence of its purpose. To the extent that 
"purpose" contains a fictional intent notion, a court might find a secular purpose 
despite a primary religious effect, but the primary effect test prevents the court 
from resting on a fiction. At the same time, the Lemon test does not help much in 
the actual determination of purpose or in determining whether an effect is 
"principal or primary" or subsidiary and secondary.224 
217. /d. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
218. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
219. /d. at 222. 
220. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
221. /d. at 612-13. 
222. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rule or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 400 (1950). 
223. The purpose of a statute will be one or more of its likely or actual effects. Effects that 
are normally undesirable, such as expense, will not usually be the law's objective. Similarly, bene-
ficial effects may be excluded from the purpose where they could be achieved more easily by 
alternative means onhey appear minor in comparison with other benefits of the law. Purpose is 
even more complex than this quick reference to important factors suggests and is the subject of rich 
literature. /d. at 400-01. 
224. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
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In Agostini v. Felton, 225 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Lemon test while 
providing evidence of problems in its application.226 The Supreme Court 
reversed a prior decisiofi227 and permitted New York to send public school 
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education.228 Just.ice 
O'Connor's majority opinion said that while the Supreme Court's general princi-
ples had not changed, it had changed its understanding of the criteria used to 
assess whether aid to religion has an impermissible effect. 229 Justice O'Connor 
wrote that the Supreme Court no longer followed a presumption that placement 
of public employees in parochial schools inevitably leads to state-sponsored 
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and 
religion.230 Justice O'Connor stated that the "entanglement" test from Lemon 
was simply an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect to advance or inhibit 
religion.231 The key issue for the majority was whether the program had the 
effect of advancing religion, and they concluded that the program "does not 
result in governmental indoctrination; define its recipients by reference to 
religion; or create an excessive entanglement.''232 
Justice O'Connor also said that the program could not be reasonably 
viewed as an endorsement of religion.233 The endorsement test permits the 
225. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). 
226. /d. at 2016-19. 
227. /d. at 2019 (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 437 U.S. 402 (1985)). 
228. /d. at 2018-19. 
229. /d. at 2010. 
230. /d. 
231. /d. at 2015. 
232 /d. at 2016. 
233. /d. The endorsement test identified by Justice O'Connor has received increasing . 
support. See Capitol Square R~view & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (holding 
that the Board could not prohibit a private group from placing a cross in a location used as a public 
forum). Justice O'Connor stated: 
[W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as 
endorsing religion, I believe it is our duty to hold the practice invalid .... 
Governmental intent cannot control, and not all state policies are permissible 
under the Religion Clauses simply because they are neutral in form. 
Where the government's operation of. a public forum has the effect of 
endorsing religion, even if the governmental actor neither intends nor actively 
encourages that result, ... the Establishment Clause is violated. 
!d. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
Justices Souter and Breyer joined O'Connor's opinion in Capital Square, and Justice Ste-
vens seemed to adopt an endorsement test as well. Justice Stevens stated, "if a reasonable person 
could perceive a government endorsement of religion from a private display, then the State may not 
allow its property to be used as a forum for that display." /d. at 2466 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The 
Justices differed on whether the determination of endorsement should be governed by the standard 
of a reasonable observer with specific knowledge of the facts surrounding the action and 
community context or by a reasonable person who might have Jess knowledge of the facts. 
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Supreme Court to say that it is applying essentially objective tests rather than 
seeking to divine "intent" or "purpose." Nevertheless, the primary objective of a 
government action that appears to endorse religion is likely to support that relig-
ion, and a government action whose objective is to support religion will appear to 
endorse it. Thus, under this test, the Supreme Court avoids the briar patch of 
governmental intent, while assuring that laws whose objective is to establish 
religion will fall. 
Justice Souter dissented in Agostini on the grounds that the program 
directly subsidized religion and could reasonably be viewed as an 
endorsement. 234 Four justices agreed in the dissent that the program breached the 
principle that the state cannot provide direct and substantial aid to religious 
institutions even if the criteria for such aid is not religious. 235 
While the generally applicable law is not exempt from establishment clause 
analysis, it will rarely fail under the current majority's test. Where the law does 
not distinguish religion from secular matters, it is unlikely the government will 
appear to be endorsing religion. The law is likely to have a secular purpose and 
affect religion only incidentally. Nevertheless, it remains theoretically possible 
for a litigant to persuade the Supreme Court that the generality of the law was a 
mask for supporting religion. The unmasking would demonstrate both religious 
purpose and endorsement. 
C. Freedom of Speech 
The question of justification for exempting generally applicable laws from 
First Amendment scrutiny may soon apply to controversies regarding the free-
dom of speech, as well as, the free exercise of religion. The law is currently in a 
state of confusion, but two cases suggest that free exercise analysis may soon be 
applied to free speech. 
1. The Conflict in the Cases on Generally Applicable Laws 
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, /nc.;m Glen Theatre, the Kitty Kat Lounge, and 
dancers Darlene Miller and Gayle Sutro challenged a state law that forbade pub-
lic nudity. m Chief Justice Rehnquist' s plurality opinion began by stating that 
nude dancing was an expression protected by the constitutional guarantee of 
freedom of speech.238 Eight of the Justices applied a four-part test to determine 
whether the state law was constitutional: 1) is the law within the constitutional 
power of government; 2) does the law further an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest; 3) is the governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of 
expression; and 4) is the incidental restriction on the alleged First Amendment 
234. Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. at 2019-22 (Souter, J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, 
JJ., dissenting). 
235. /d. at 2022-25 (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
236. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
237. /d. at 562-63. 
238. /d. at 565-66. 
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freedoms no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest.239 
The justices applying this level of scrutiny, which carefully analyzed the interests 
involved, split evenly on the outcome. Justice Scalia, who cast the deciding vote, 
argued that dancing was conduct, not speech, and that the appropriate inquiry 
was whether the suppression of the expressive aspect of that conduct was the 
object of the law.2AO In this respect, Justice Scalia applied Smith's principle that a 
neutral law of general applicability was constitutional.241 
The test used by the eight Justices in Barnes may be equivalent to the 
"reasonably proportionate" standard evoked in Australian cases.242 Justice Lewis 
Powell used the idea of proportionality in examining the constitutionality of 
regulating nonrnisleading lawyer advertising.243 "Even when a communication is 
not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate. But the State must 
assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in propor-
tion to the interest served."244 Justice Scalia later cited Justice Powell's statement 
when Scalia argued that the requirement that a regulation not "burden 
substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's 
legitimate interests"24S did not require a showing that the law was the least 
restrictive alternative, but only that it was proportional: 
What our decisions require is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends 
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends," ... -a fit that is not nec-
essarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single 
best disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion to the interest 
served," ... that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as 
we have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to 
governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best 
be employed. 246 
In another recent case, Justice O'Connor said the requ~rement that laws 
regulating commercial speech can be no more extensive "than is necessary" to 
239. /d. at 567 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.). Justice Souter 
agreed in the four-part analysis. /d. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice White followed the 
same analysis. See id. al. 590 (White, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., 
dissenting). 
2AO. /d. at 576-79 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
241. /d. at 577-78. 
242 See supra notes 157-71 and accompanying text. 
243. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 (1982) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563-64 (1980)). 
244. /d. at 203. 
245. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (quoting from Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 
246. /d. at 480 (citations omitted). 
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serve the governmental interest required that the law be proportionate.247 
"[T]here must be a fit between the legislature's goal and method, 'a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served. "'248 
Justice O'Connor elaborated on the proportionality test used for commer-
cial speech, stating that the fit between means and ends must be narrowly tailored 
and the scope of the restriction on speech must be reasonably targeted to address 
the harm intended to be regulated.249 The regulation must carefully calculate the 
costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibi-
tion; less burdensome alternatives to reach the stated goal indicate the fit between 
means and ends may be too imprecise.~ If alternative channels permit commu-
nication of the restrictive speech, the regulation is more likely to be considered 
reasonable. 251 
Justice Scalia urged a very deferential view toward the application of the 
proportionality standard in a variety of contexts. Justice Scalia specifically 
pointed to the Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto 
Rico252 decision as an example of the relevant degree of deference.253 The 
Supreme Court has since rejected Posadas in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
lsland,254 requiring a closer look at the legislation and whether it is sufficiently 
narrowly tailored.255 
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court will closely scrutinize and apply 
the concept of proportionality to generally applicable laws. Three days after its 
decision in Barnes, the Supreme Court decided Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 256 
saying that a generally applicable law does not offend the First Amendment sim-
ply because their enforcement agairist the press has incidental effects on its 
ability to get and report the news.257 Instead of nude dancing, Cohen involved 
the publication of significant information about a political campaign.258 After the 
Minneapolis Star agreed not to reveal his identity, Daniel Cohen, an employee of 
the Republican candidate for governor, gave the newspaper copies of public rec-
ords that showed that the Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor had been 
charged with unlawful assembly and had been convicted of petty theft. 259 When 
the paper discovered that the unlawful assembly charges concerned a protest over 
failure to hire minorities, and that the theft was a failure to pay for six dollars of 
'lA1. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1521 (1996) (quoting Board of 
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. · 
'lAS. /d. 
'lA9. /d. (citing Aorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371, 2380-81 (1995)). 
250. /d. (citing Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,417 (1993)). 
251. /d. 
252 Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
253. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. at 1522. 
254. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996). 
255. ld. at 1510-14. 
256. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
257. /d. at 669. 
258. /d. at 665-66. 
259. /d. at 665. 
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sewing materials on leaving a store during a period when the candidate had been 
under a great emotional strain, the paper revealed that Cohen had given them the 
records.2ffi Not surprisingly, this revelation embarrassed Cohen's employer and 
Cohen was subsequently fired. 2151 Cohen responded by suing the Minneapolis 
Star.2152 The newspaper contended that its decision to identify Cohen was pro-
tected by the First Amendment.263 The Supreme Court held that Cohen might 
pursue a promissory estoppel action, because promissory estoppel was a rule of 
general application and the application to speech here was not a product of gov-
ernmental choice of forbidden speech, but a result of the defendant's own 
promise. 264 
Justice Anthony Kennedy later noted the conflicting rationales of Cohen 
and Barnes and stated that ''the enforcement of a generally applicable law may or 
may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment. " 2155 
2. The Relationship of American Indecision to Australia 
The freedom of political discussion implied from the principle of repre-
sentative government found in the Australian Constitution is unlikely to apply to 
topless dancing in King's Cross, but it could well apply to a journalist's revela-
tion of a source for information about a political candidate in an election. Chief 
Justice Mason cited Cohen in his opinion in ACTV,2156 noting that "in the United 
States, despite the First Amendment, the media is subject to laws of general 
application. "1ST 
Both Australian and American judges have distinguished between laws 
targeted at ideas and laws that are content-neutral in regulating the means of 
260. /d. at 665-66. 
261. /d. at 666. 
262 /d. at 665. 
263. /d. at 668. 
264. /d. at 669-71. 
265. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994). That same term Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Madsen v. Women's Health Center reviewed an injunction against 
abortion pickets in which he stated: 
If this were a content-neutral, generally applicable statute, instead of an 
injunctive order, its constitutionality would be assessed under the standard set 
forth in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, and similar cases. Given that the forum 
around the clinic is a traditional public forum, we would determine whether the 
time, place and manner regulations were "narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest." 
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr, 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (1994) (citations omitted). But this 
0 'Brien-like standard is applied to regulations of the public forum, which is quite different than the 
statute that is not so confined. 
266. Australian Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 
106, 143 (Mason, C.J.). 
267. /d. 
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expression, noting that the former require a higher degree of justification than the 
latter.268 American Courts have gone further with the suggestion in Cohen that 
the content-neutral law that is of general application requires no justification at 
all.2eJ The only generally applicable laws challenged in Australia as violations of 
the implied freedom of political communication were upheld in opinions that 
found them appropriate and adapted to serve legitimate purposes, a test that was 
not thoroughly explored.vo The High Court, therefore, remains free to decide 
what degree of scrutiny should be given neutral laws of general application for 
compatibility with the implied freedom of political discussion. 
IV. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS 
The neutral law of general applicability has two characteristics that make it 
arguably immune from First Amendment concerns. The first is that it affects 
primarily noncommunicative secular behavior. Such a law is normally justified 
by an interest unrelated to the suppression of communication or religion. In other 
words, it carries prima facie indicia of a legitimate government concern. 
The second characteristic of the neutral law of general applicability follows 
from the first. Since the law's object is, on its face, unrelated to religion or 
expression, any impact on religion or communication appears to be incidental to 
another purpose. 
A. The Case for Generally Applicable Laws 
The contention that these characteristics of the neutral law of general 
applicability immunize it from scrutiny under the First Amendment depends on 
one of two propositions. Either the generality proves that the social interest the 
law serves outweighs the individual's interest in religion or expression, or 
freedom is defined in terms of governmental behavior rather than the impact on 
the individual. 
Cqntent-neutrality and general applicability do not indicate the importance 
of the underlying social interest justifying the law, which may be anything from 
protecting grass to preventing the collapse of western civilization (assuming 
those two are different). If all content-neutral laws of general applicability are 
consistent with the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, the slightest 
social interest must outweigh the injury done to religious exercise or speech. 
That will be true only if the generality of the law assures that the injury to the 
exercise of religion or freedom of speech is slight. Although the affected indi-
vidual would disagree, it can be argued that society's interest in free religious 
exercise or free expression is not significantly impaired by the general law. Peo-
ple are more likely to be hurt when someone is out to get them. Where only 
incidental impacts on religious exercise or expression are permitted, no one need 
268. See for example, the opinions of Justices Mason, McHugh, Deane, and Toohey in 
Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (Austl. 1992) 177 C.L.R. 1. 
UJ9. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. at 669. 
270. See, e.g., Langer v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1997) 134 A.L.R. 400, 405-06 (Brennan, 
C.J.). 
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fear that disagreement with their beliefs or views will result in laws against them. 
The particular law will not discourage speech or religious acts beyond its imme-
diate application. The law does not affect the quality of free exercise of religion 
for society despite its impact on individual worshippers. 
Alternatively, the free exercise of religion may be defined in terms of free-
dom from improper governmental action. If religious exercise is behavior 
impelled by religious belief, the free exercise of religion may be defined as the 
absence of restrictions based on disapproval of that belief. Disapproval or 
disagreement with the belief is not a legitimate basis for governmental action. 
Under this definition of freedom, as long as the impact on religious exercise is 
purely incidental, there is no prohibition of free exercise. 
This discussion suggests that the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court to exempt laws of general applicability from scrutiny is prompted by the 
same concern for the purpose of the law that marks the Australian High Court's 
approach in religion cases and is visible in its decisions on the implied freedom 
of political discussion. 
There are two major arguments in favor of the view that laws of general 
application do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. First, that doctrine satis-
fies the demand for formal equality between believers and nonbelievers, the 
concern for governmental neutrality between differing views. Second, it creates 
an objective standard that avoids the appearance of political decisions. 
Challenges to the impact of laws of general application on particular relig-
ious exercises usually call for an exemption from the operation of the law for the 
believer. Such an exemption raises issues of formal equality; if we seek religious 
neutrality, society should not prefer belief to disbelief and it should not privilege 
the believer to engage in conduct that the nonbeliever cannot pursue. The con-
cern for neutrality is underscored by the constitutional prohibitions on 
establishing religion. While there are appropriate responses to this view, it 
remains a powerful ground to support the position of the Supreme Court. 
Further, because no one suggests an absolute immunity for religious exer-
cise, the alternative to exempting laws of general application is to balance the 
value of the religious exercise against the values served by the conflicting law. 
Such judicial weighing exposes the Justices to criticism for arbitrary and subjec-
tive decisions. Justices, as closely attuned definitionally as Justices Deane and 
Toohey, parted over migration agent registration in Cunliffe.V1 United States 
Supreme Court Justices disagreed on the strength of the respective interests in 
Smith. m Justice Scalia stated in Smith: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that 
are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law 
271. See Cunliffe v. Commonwealth (Austl. 1994) 182 C.L.R. 274. 
272. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
HeinOnline -- 46 Drake L. Rev. 94 1997-1998
94 Drake Law Review [Vol. 46 
unto itsel{ or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws 
against the centrality of all religious beliefs. m 
B. The Weaknesses of Immunity for Generally Applicable Laws 
The "talismanic" immunity of the law of general application, however, 
does not comport with the reasons offered for it. The law may be prima facie 
legiti~ate, but a closer look can reveal that the law violates the premises of free 
exercise. 
Once a doctrine of immunity is established, clever draftsman will invoke it. 
Even laws of general applicability are susceptible to pretextual use. If one seeks 
to injure the Native American church, a general proscription of the use of hallu-
cinogens, including peyote, will do it. It may be using an awkward instrument to 
accomplish the goal, like draining the lake to catch a bass, but it will be used if 
the Supreme Court allows. The awkwardness of using laws of general applica-
bility to accomplisQ a targeted result may justify a prima facie assumption that no 
improper purpose was involved, but it does not justify ignoring the possibility 
under any theory of freedom of religion. 
The exemption for laws of general application, because their impact on 
religion is incidental, overlooks the potential of a segmented analysis. Even 
though the law was justified on a neutral basis, it could have provided an exemp-
tion for applications to religious exercise. The failure to provide an exemption 
may have been the product of antipathy to that religion. For example, the denial 
of unemployment payments to an individual that refuses work is a rule of general 
application, but pay is granted to some persons where the refusal to work is 
justified. The failure to acknowledge religion as a sufficient justification for 
refusal to work may flow from a disregard for- the importance of religion to the 
individual. Allowing unemployment pay where religious principles cause the 
refusal to work has no significant effect on the unemployment compensation 
system's operation. Where the interest of the state in applying a general law to 
religion is a weak one, the possibility that the application is a result of forbidden 
purpose is strong. 
Accepting the idea that the objective of the law is crucial to its constitu-
tionality, no law should be immune from review for compatibility with the 
Constitution. General applicability alone does not negate the possibility of an 
impermissible objective. The opinions of the Justices in the Australian freedom 
of political discussion cases have demonstrated the utility of a test of 
proportionality to assure that the impact of a law on speech (and religion) is 
entirely incidental and necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate purpose. 
But proportionality alone will not resolve all questions, since the Court may dif-
fer on whether the law is proportional. Given the risk to fundamental values, the 
Court should scrutinize challenged laws with care rather than deferring to the 
surface plausibility of the state's asserted justification. 
'2:13. !d. at 890. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The neutrality and general applicability of a law serves as an indicia that it 
is compatible with the free exercise of religion and freedom of speech, but it is 
not a guarantee of consistency even if those human rights are viewed in terms of 
the legitimate and illegitimate purposes of government. Unless we demand 
strong reasons for restrictions that apply to religion and speech, as well as to 
other matters, we may find our freedoms wane. 
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